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Foreword
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are signed,
and how does the implementation of such agreements influence their effective-
ness? These are the questions that motivate the Implementation and Effectiveness
of International Environmental Commitments (IEC) Project at the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria.
In this IEC essay, Cesare Romano reviews and assesses efforts within the
International Labour Organization (ILO) to supervise national implementation of
international labor standards. Today, ILO supervision includes an active system
of regular reviews as well as several special procedures that can be invoked
on an ad hoc basis to handle particular problems of noncompliance when they
arise. Developed over 70 years, it is the most elaborate and active multilateral
compliance supervision system in international law.
Romano applies lessons from the ILO experience to the design of possible
multilateral supervision systems within environmental agreements. He focuses
in particular on the Multilateral Consultative Process (Article 13) of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This essay is one of three
from the IEC Project that apply historical experience to the possible designs for
Article 13 of the Climate Convention. The essays are contributions to the work
of the Advisory Group on Article 13, a legal and technical expert body that is
currently exploring the need and possible designs for Article 13.
Prof. Eugene B. Skolnikoff
Project Co-leader
International Environmental Commitments Project, IIASA
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Executive Summary
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a specialized agency of the United
Nations particularly active in protecting those human rights related to labor con-
ditions. Since its foundation in 1919, the ILO has developed a comprehensive
international labor code. Today, ILO standards, codified in 176 conventions and
183 recommendations, address labor conditions in more than 170 Member States.
A cornerstone of the ILO’s activity is its unique and effective system of super-
vision of the implementation of ILO standards. This paper analyzes the different
factors that contribute to the effectiveness of the ILO supervisory system, which
are themselves the subject of some debate. It also focuses on lessons that may
be applicable to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
particularly in the ongoing debate on the design of mechanisms under Article 13
(the Multilateral Consultative Process). The specific functions of Article 13 still
remain unclear; however, they might include dispute avoidance mechanisms, su-
pervision of implementation, and/or management of noncompliance. The ILO’s
experience offers relevant insight into each of these functions. Yet, a strong caveat
must be introduced. The ILO and environmental regimes differ greatly in their
aims, structure, and historical development. Therefore, lessons from the ILO
might be relevant but must be applied with caution.
The main difference between the ILO and other existing international regimes,
not only environmental regimes, is the ILO’s unique tripartite structure of rep-
resentatives of governments, workers, and employers. Non-State actors are rep-
resented on an equal footing with States in the plenary organ (the International
Labour Conference) and in the executive organ (the Governing Body). They
play a key role in the adoption of international labor standards and, therefore,
are equal participants in all supervisory procedures. The majority of cases un-
der ad hoc procedures have been initiated by non-State actors, mainly workers
organizations. Without their participation, the ILO supervisory system would be
significantly less effective. This suggests that allowing non-State actors to play
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a role in supervisory mechanisms could enhance the implementation of interna-
tional commitments overall. Yet, this specific lesson from the ILO experience
can hardly be applied to multilateral environmental treaties. In fact, the role of
non-State actors in supervisory procedures depends fundamentally on how they
are integrated into the organization as a whole – from the setting of standards to
the supervision of their implementation.
The ILO supervisory system has a dual approach that ultimately forms a loop.
On one side, the regular procedure provides routine reviews of the implementation
of ILO standards. On the other side, several ad hoc procedures can be activated on
an adversarial basis to handle alleged cases of noncompliance. Compliance issues
are examined by two tiers of complementary bodies: first by relatively small
technical bodies (for example, the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations and the tripartite Committee on Freedom of
Association), and then by larger, more politically oriented organs (the Governing
Body and/or eventually the International Labour Conference and its Committee
on Applications). The ability of the ILO supervisory system to improve the
implementation of ILO standards owes much to this division of competencies
between small technical organs and large political bodies, which can reinforce each
other’s actions. Most issues involving application are handled by the Committee
of Experts; political bodies focus their attention on the more difficult and delicate
matters, but they may and often do refer them back to the Committee of Experts
for further monitoring.
The main feature of the ILO supervisory system is that, rather than settling
formal disputes, it uses regular supervision to help avoid disputes altogether and
to enhance overall compliance. This particular characteristic is highly relevant to
today’s debates on the design of consultation and dispute avoidance mechanisms
in multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, whereas the ILO supervisory
system is extremely active and effective, dispute settlement procedures in multi-
lateral environmental agreements have never been invoked.
The ILO experience underscores the importance of an evolutionary approach
to the development of systems of supervision. The present structure of the ILO
supervisory system is the result of several adjustments made by the International
Labour Conference and the Governing Body over more than three-quarters of a
century. The system’s growth and adaptation over the years, as it has worked to
enhance its effectiveness, bear witness to its vitality.
However, despite its long evolution and expanding array of supervisory pro-
cedures, the ILO system remains a cohesive structure. The same supervisory
system applies to all ILO conventions and is legally binding for all Member States
that have ratified them. The authority of the entire system flows from a single
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source, the ILO Constitution. Therefore, despite the great number of ILO stan-
dards, a single supervisory system helps to reduce the confusion and institutional
redundancy that might have resulted had many standard-specific systems been
developed. This lesson from the ILO suggests that supervisory functions in the
climate regime might be more effective if they have a common core under Article
13 that applies to all subsequent climate commitments (for example, Protocols to
the Framework Convention) and develop subsidiary ad hoc procedures as needed
for particular obligations.
Of the different procedures available in the ILO supervisory system, the regu-
lar procedure has achieved the greatest results. It is the heart of the whole system,
where most of the supervisory work takes place. The regular procedure hinges
on periodic reports that Member States are required to submit on the measures
taken to implement the provisions of the conventions they have ratified. These
reports are reviewed through the regular procedure, during which specific issues
and problems are highlighted for further attention by the standing Committee of
Experts; some are then examined by the International Labour Conference.
A crucial asset of the ILO supervisory system is that it offers a continuum
of procedures, from the regular to the ad hoc systems. The ad hoc procedures,
which are activated on an adversarial basis, were developed to deal with issues of
noncompliance. They range from the soft and politically oriented representation
procedure to the quasi-judicial complaints procedure. Moreover, the ILO has
developed some special procedures for dealing with cases of noncompliance
with certain fundamentally important conventions, notably those concerning the
freedom of association and the right to engage in collective bargaining. The
general characteristic of all these ad hoc procedures is that they are activated only
when needed; they are, to different degrees, confrontational in their approach;
and they provide for a two-tiered review. The substance of the work is carried
out by a tripartite committee of ILO Governing Body members of an independent
panel of experts named by it; any decision on measures to be taken to induce
noncompliant States back into compliance are adopted by the Governing Body, a
politically oriented body.
The ILO’s high degree of effectiveness stems not only from the flexibility and
broad scope of its supervisory procedure but also from the particular features of
the norms whose implementation is to be monitored. ILO Member States have the
possibility of making an “a` la carte” ratification, opting for only certain provisions
of ILO conventions when the text so provides. Moreover, an ILO convention is
adopted only after its subject matter has reached a sufficient degree of develop-
ment and importance, and there is widespread consensus. Such a system clearly
depends on the States’ willingness to commit themselves through ratification.
xTo this end, the ILO Director-General is particularly engaged in promoting the
ratification of ILO conventions. Furthermore, the ILO has developed some pro-
cedures for limited supervision of nonbinding standards (recommendations and
unratified conventions). This particular ILO experience illustrates how relevant
but nonbinding commitments can be integrated into the larger complex of legal
standards that influence a State’s behavior.
Finally, the efforts to strengthen ILO supervision have included providing
assistance to Member States in order to increase the implementation of ILO
standards. The effectiveness of the ILO supervisory system is enhanced because
supervision takes place alongside ILO efforts to provide technical assistance to
Member States. This offers direct benefits to the countries and improves their
capacity to participate in the work of the ILO.
A system of direct contacts between a representative of the ILO Director-
General and Member States is used to increase dialogue, provide advice to Member
States, facilitate conciliation, and, in a few cases, to assist in fact-finding. These
procedures are by nature extremely flexible and appear to possess considerable
growth potential.
In short, the ILO has been remarkably effective in promoting the implemen-
tation of labor commitments. However, ILO supervisory procedures, in general,
are not able to overcome major cases of noncompliance in short periods of time.
In the field of environmental protection, where damage is cumulative, a time-
consuming process for resolving cases of noncompliance may be problematic.
Continual noncompliance with environmental obligations, even by relatively few
States, might offset the efforts of the majority of States that do comply. It may
also undermine confidence, which is ultimately essential to the continuation of
effective collaboration to solve common environmental problems.
Finally, the ILO experience strongly suggests that building any system of
supervision requires time for growth, learning, and adjustment. With that in
mind, architects of supervisory systems in other regimes, including the climate
regime, might limit their action to the adoption of modest systems at the early
stages and explicitly provide for their adjustment over time.
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Introduction
As the Preamble to the ILO Constitution proclaims, universal and lasting peace
can be established only if it is based on social justice.[1] This principle, which
is reaffirmed in the Declaration of Philadelphia, has always guided the actions of
the ILO.[2] It should be the basis of policy for all member States in conformity
with the notion that “the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of
labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the
conditions in their own countries.”[3] The ILO was founded in 1919 primarily to
improve living and working conditions by building a comprehensive international
labor code. This standard-setting function is still the main means of action of
the ILO.[4] A total of 359 international labor instruments were adopted by the
International Labour Conference between 1919 and 1995 (176 conventions and
183 recommendations). As of 8 December 1995, the total number of ratifications
was 6,292. At the end of 1995, 173 States were members of the organization.[5]
Such an enormous legislative effort would be devoid of any practical meaning
if it were not sustained by effective supervision of its application. This is why su-
pervision of States’ application of standards (conventions and recommendations)
is ranked among the most important of the ILO’s activities.
With the end of the Cold War, some of the States’ criticism and wariness
of the ILO compliance monitoring system has disappeared.[6] Since the end
of the 1980s there has been a steady increase in the number of Member States
as well as progress in the number of ratifications of ILO conventions and in
the implementation of ILO standards. Finally, the increased interdependence of
domestic markets and the consequent rise in levels of economic competition have
heightened the importance of labor standards and their effective implementation
as a means of achieving a “level playing field” among competitors subject to
different national regulatory systems.
This paper intends to provide the reader with a review of the operation and
effectiveness of the principal elements of the ILO supervisory system. The ILO’s
supervisory procedure is, by far, the oldest of the systems of supervision managed
2by international organizations. Its basic principles were established at the same
time the ILO was created, in 1919, whereas the other systems of some importance
were created less than a decade later and then again at the end of World War II.
The ILO is the only major intergovernmental organization to have survived the
Second World War and the demise of the League of Nations. In 1945 it became
a specialized agency of the United Nations. Because of the experience acquired
during its 77 years in use, the ILO compliance monitoring procedure still serves
as a point of reference for other international organizations and legal regimes.[7]
In the past decade, environmental issues have gained international promi-
nence. As with labor standards, it is increasingly important that international
agreements to protect the environment include measures to ensure compliance.
Typically, international environmental treaties include dispute settlement proce-
dures that could serve this function. In practice, such procedures are never used.
In part, this nonuse reflects that formal dispute settlement requires the existence of
both an overt dispute and demonstrable injury from noncompliance. However, en-
vironmental problems such as ozone depletion and global warming are cumulative
and incompletely understood. Policy action and compliance with international
environmental agreements must occur long before any material damage can be
proved. Furthermore, in multilateral agreements the benefits of compliance are
dispersed among many parties. No single party has a strong incentive to identify
and pursue a bilateral dispute. These are the reasons the ILO’s multilateral system
for supervision, which helps avoid disputes and ensure compliance, is relevant
to today’s debates on the design of dispute avoidance and compliance control
mechanisms in multilateral environmental agreements.
In the second part of this work, the review of the ILO supervisory system
will be used to ascertain the main lessons that can be applied to those multilateral
environmental treaties where these issues are being debated in an effort to design
effective dispute avoidance and settlement mechanisms. In this sense, the paper
will focus on those lessons that can be applied directly to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, particularly to the ongoing debate
on design mechanisms under Article 13 of the Convention and its relation to the
system of regular review of “national communications.”[8]
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The ILO System of Supervision
ILO Institutional Structure
The ILO is composed of a yearly plenary assembly, the International Labour Con-
ference; an executive council, the Governing Body; and a permanent secretariat,
the International Labour Office.
The International Labour Conference elects the Governing Body, adopts the
organization’s budget, sets international labor standards, and provides a forum for
the discussion of social and labor questions. Each national delegation is composed
of four persons: two government delegates, one employers delegate, and one
workers delegate, who may be accompanied by a limited number of technical
advisers. Adoption of a decision in the form of a convention or recommendation
requires a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the accredited delegates
present. Conventions enter into force for each Member State only after they are
ratified. Conversely, recommendations are not legally binding on Member States.
The Governing Body holds three sessions a year. It is composed of 28 gov-
ernment members, 14 employer members, and 14 worker members, plus deputy
members. Ten States of chief industrial importance have permanent government
representatives, the others are elected by the Conference every three years.
Finally, the International Labour Office is headed by a Director-General
elected by the Governing Body.
The Supervisory System of the ILO
The ILO is characterized by three basic features: one of its main means of action
is the adoption of international treaties; it is endowed with a unique tripartite
structure of government, labor, and employer representatives; and it is endowed
with detailed supervisory procedures.[9]
4The supervisory system of the ILO is essentially based on two types of
procedures – a regular procedure and ad hoc procedures (i.e., activated on an
adversarial basis).[10] The basis of the ILO’s supervisory system is described
in its Constitution.[11] However, its present structure is the result of a series of
adjustments made by the Conference and the Governing Body over the years in
an effort to adapt the procedure to the increasing numbers of conventions and
States that are parties to them.[12] Notably, because of the constant increase in
the number of conventions, it became impossible for the International Labour
Conference to examine at its annual sessions all the reports that the governments
were obliged to submit on their implementation of ILO conventions. Thus,
in 1926 the Governing Body established two special bodies to deal with these
reports: the independent Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations and the Conference Committee on the Application of
Conventions.[13]
Regular Procedure and National Reporting System
The regular procedure is described in Articles 19, 22, and 23 of the Constitution.
Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of Article 19 contain a series of requirements designed
to ensure that the executive and legislative branches of Member States give
full consideration to both the possibility of implementing and the advisability
of ratifying a convention. Namely, the instrument, either a convention or a
recommendation, must, within a period of 12 to 18 months after its adoption by
the International Labour Conference, be brought before the competent national
authority or authorities for the enactment of domestic legislation or other action.
Clearly, only duly ratified conventions become legally binding at the international
level. If the competent authority agrees to ratify a convention, then the Member
State will communicate the formal instrument of ratification to the International
Labour Office and will take such action as may be necessary to implement the
provisions of the convention.[14]
The ILO supervisory system relies on periodic reports that Member States,
under Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, are obliged to present to the International
Labour Office on measures taken to implement provisions of the conventions they
have ratified. These reports should be in the form and should contain the par-
ticulars requested by the Governing Body (see Appendices I and II). Moreover,
under the 1946 amendments to the ILO Constitution, governments must dis-
tribute copies of these reports to those workers and employers organizations that
are represented in the International Labour Conference in order to solicit their
5observations.[15] During 1995, the ILO received 159 observations, 38 of which
were from employers organizations and 121 from workers organizations, for ex-
amination by the Committee of Experts.[16] The fact that the great majority of
observations received usually concern the implementation of ratified conventions
bears witness of the key role played by non-State entities in the ILO compliance
monitoring system.[17] Finally, it should be stressed that, of the observations
received during 1995, 90 were communicated directly to the Organization, while
69 were communicated to the ILO by the governments, which in some cases added
their own comments.[18]
The Constitution in itself does not contain extensive provisions on how na-
tional reports must be examined. Article 23(1) of the Constitution merely states
that the Director-General shall lay before the next meeting of the Conference a
summary of the information and reports communicated to him by members in pur-
suance of Articles 19 and 22. In reality, a much more complex supervisory system
has been put in place through a series of decisions by the Governing Body. Neither
the International Labour Office, which is the secretariat of the Organization, nor
the Conference, which is essentially a deliberative, political body, could properly
carry out a thorough and objective evaluation of the governments’ reports.[19]
The procedure was, therefore, delegated to an independent technical body, the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.
The Committee of Experts is currently composed of 20 members (compared
with 8 during its initial period of operation) who sit in their personal capacities.
The members are proposed by the Director-General and appointed by the Govern-
ing Body for three-year terms. Member States, therefore, are not directly involved
in the process. The perception that the members of the ILO Committee of Experts
are objectively selected rather than politically appointed may have contributed
considerably to its reputation for objectivity and competence. Often, members of
the Committee of Experts are reappointed for successive terms. All are eminent
jurists, expert either in labor law or public international law.
The Committee of Experts meets annually on a date fixed by the Governing
Body. Its role is to carry out an independent and technical evaluation of the
national reports and to report to the Conference on the degree to which national
practices and legislation conform to international obligations.[20]
From the beginning, the Committee of Experts has been fully aware that
a key objective of supervision is to obtain full and accurate data.[21] To this
end, the ILO developed the practice of sending a detailed questionnaire to the
parties to each convention. The questionnaire concentrates on four sources of
information: national legislation; judicial decisions; reports of activities of labor
6inspection services; and information on the participation of employers and workers
organizations.
The purpose of this questionnaire is to make it possible to determine whether
a country’s domestic law and practice conform to the relevant ILO conventions
and recommendations, and the ILO Constitution. Undeniably, governments can
try to avoid control by simply neglecting to mention any piece of legislation or
practice that is not compatible with the conventions concerned. To avoid this risk,
governments are requested to send copies of their reports to national organizations
of employers and workers, which may present comments thereon.[22] Non-State
entities are, therefore, extremely important for the ILO system because they
increase the credibility of the data-gathering process.
The steady increase of the Committee of Experts’ workload, resulting from
the increases in the number of Member States and the number of conventions
adopted and ratified has obliged the Committee to review its procedure three
times: in 1959, in 1976, and in 1993.[23] The 1959 adjustment provided that
detailed reports on ratified conventions should no longer be requested each year,
but every two years. In 1976, the Governing Body decided to further reduce the
frequency of reports. As a general rule, reports would henceforth be requested
every four years, although the two-year period was retained for the most important
conventions, in particular those concerning freedom of association, forced labor,
and discrimination.
The last adjustment, in 1993, introduced an even more elaborate structure.[24]
As a general rule, reports are now due every five years, with some exceptions.
A detailed first report is requested in the year following the enactment of a
convention in a given State. A second detailed report is automatically requested
two years after the first. For some important conventions, like those on the
freedom of association (nos. 87 and 98), forced labor (nos. 29 and 105), equal
treatment (nos. 100 and 111), labor inspection (nos. 81 and 129), and tripartite
consultations (no. 144), reports are due every three years. A further category of
reports was introduced that includes any report that the Conference Committee
or the Committee of Experts might request on their own initiative. Finally, the
obligation to submit reports has been waived for 21 conventions that were deemed
not to correspond to present-day needs.[25]
During 1995, 1,252 detailed reports were due under Article 22 of the ILO
Constitution.[26] However, by the end of its 83rd Session, the Committee of
Experts had received only 824 reports, a mere 65%.[27] Only 38.2% had been
received within the fixed deadline, although late reports may also be examined.
Some reports were incomplete and therefore did not allow the Committee of
7Experts to reach substantive conclusions on Member States’ implementation of
the conventions concerned.
The ILO Committee of Experts undertakes a technical examination of reports
submitted on ratified conventions in a closed session, without the presence of the
States’ representatives or those of organizations of employers or workers. There
is no media publicity covering the work of the Committee. Closed meetings, the
absence of publicity, and the absence of parties’ representatives have contributed
significantly to the depoliticization of the ILO’s regular review, thus enhancing
the reputation of the Committee.[28]
All these efforts to obtain objective, credible, and meaningful reports through
the independent judgment of technical experts are aimed to provide a solid basis
for discussion at the annual sessions of the International Labour Conference
and, in particular, for discussion in the Conference Committee. The Conference
Committee is a tripartite organ consisting of representatives of governments,
employers, and workers.[29] Moreover, voting within the Conference Committee
is weighted to give equal strength to each group.[30] The Conference Committee’s
tripartite composition makes it a particularly effective part of the procedure. The
participation of nongovernmental interests directly concerned with the issues
enables the Committee to more closely grasp the problems of implementation and
the various political interests than would be possible in a body merely composed
of independent experts.
The aim of the Conference Committee proceedings is to give governments
the opportunity to add, through their representatives, any observations they think
desirable to make; to clear up any points to which the Committee of Experts has
drawn attention; or to seek guidance on how to overcome any difficulties met
in the implementation of their commitments.[31] The Conference Committee is
free to concentrate on those Experts’ comments that it considers to be of special
interest, and it is not bound by the conclusions contained in the report of the
Committee of Experts. Finally, despite the divergent views often expressed when
the Committee of Experts’ report is discussed in the Conference, the report is
usually adopted unanimously, not only because of obvious time constraints, but
probably also because the members of the Conference do not want to undermine
the credibility of the entire supervisory system by arguing about the conclusions of
the Committee of Experts.[32] The final outcome of the Conference Committee
procedure is a new report that is discussed and submitted for adoption by the
plenary International Labour Conference.
The mandate of the Conference Committee is quite vague. Article 7 of the
Standing Orders of the Conference merely states that its tasks are to consider the
measures taken by members to implement the conventions, to study information
8furnished by members concerning the results of inspection, and to submit a re-
port to the Conference. The Conference Committee’s procedure is public and,
comprising some 200 members, it differs substantially in composition from the
Committee of Experts. Thus, the Conference Committee, on the whole, does not
serve a judicial function; it simply provides a forum for the discussion of problems
governments encounter when implementing their obligations and at the same time
exposes the debate to public scrutiny.
Despite this “soft” approach to States’ compliance with ILO conventions, the
Conference Committee has developed a practice of singling out States that have
not adequately implemented ratified conventions. The States’ sometimes harsh
reactions to special mention in these reports is evidence that the “mobilization
of shame” is a sensitive matter that governments do not take lightly or ignore.
In three cases the report of the Conference Committee was not adopted because
of a deliberately engineered lack of quorum (in 1974, 1977, and 1982).[33]
Moreover, in 1977 the USA withdrew from the ILO on the grounds, inter alia,
that ILO activities were lacking in due process, evidenced a double standard, and
ultimately, were increasingly politicized. Despite all these criticisms the ILO
constituency, and notably the workers’ representatives, have strongly defended
the ILO. For example, from 1977 to 1980, the period in which the USA was not a
member, a number of countries made voluntary contributions to the Organization.
The ILO experience, therefore, establishes that criticism of States, however
diplomatically worded, may elicit strong opposition from those criticized and their
allies, and may in the end threaten the very existence of the review system. Only
a well-established, technically credible committee that has a firm reputation for
objectivity and competence and that is backed by the organization as a whole can
withstand bitter political opposition.
Procedure for the Supervision and Recommendations of Unratified Conventions
As a complement to the regular procedure for supervision of ratified conventions,
the ILO supervisory system also includes a regular survey of national legislation
related to conventions that have not been ratified [as set forth in Articles 19(5)(e)
and 6(d) of the ILO Constitution]. This complementary review cannot be con-
sidered a strictly supervisory one. It is merely concerned with the action taken
by Member States with respect to recommendations and unratified conventions;
usually, it does not examine individual situations in depth.
Under Article 19, general surveys are made yearly by the Committee of Ex-
perts on a subject selected by the Governing Body (e.g., the subject in 1994 was the
freedom of association and collective bargaining). The fundamental conventions
9have periodically been selected, and the ILO Governing Body recently decided to
make this a regular practice for instruments dealing with freedom of association
and collective bargaining, forced labor, discrimination, equal renumeration, and
child labor. The general reports contain a broad analysis of domestic laws, admin-
istrative action, and collective agreements, as well as comments by the Committee
of Experts on their consistency with the instruments in question.
Employers and workers organizations are encouraged to comment on reports
made by their governments for these general surveys. Moreover, while informa-
tion provided by governments usually relates to obstacles to ratification, comments
made by employers and workers organizations can refer to possible abuses arising
from the fact that the State concerned is not bound by a particular convention. A
certain number of employers and workers organizations already make use of this
possibility.[34] Depending on the nature of the comments received, the Commit-
tee of Experts, the Conference Committee, and the Governing Body might discuss
a particular situation and in certain cases suggest that there be direct contacts be-
tween the Office and the government in an effort to overcome the difficulties.
The comments might also lead the supervisory bodies to recommend that ILO
technical assistance be used to overcome problems encountered by governments
in ratifying the convention. They might also recommend an examination of the
problems encountered by workers and employers organizations as a consequence
of a government’s failure to ratify the convention at issue.
Under Article 19(5)(e), Member States are requested to explain the difficulties
that prevent or delay the ratification of ILO conventions. This explains why the
analysis of these surveys has continued to grow in importance. Despite their
relevance, some conventions have not been ratified because certain provisions
are considered by Member States to be too inflexible and certain requirements
too demanding. In this sense, the general surveys produced by the Committee
of Experts represent a unique source of information for revising, updating, and
improving ILO standards in order to promote their adoption by Member States.[35]
In fact, ILO instruments basically aim to set minimum standards. Knowing why
a State fails to ratify an ILO convention could provide useful insight for striking a
better balance between the minimumcommon denominator among Member States
and the progressive development of international obligations in the labor field.
Ad Hoc Procedures
During its first 40 years of existence, the supervisory system of the ILO, more or
less, consisted only of the regular procedure based on national reports. The regular
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procedure is still the fulcrum of the whole ILO supervisory system. However,
during the past 30 years, ad hoc procedures have gained prominence in the ILO. In
the ILO supervisory system, there exist four mechanisms that on an ad hoc basis
can be activated by adversarial action. All are more adversarial than the regular
procedure. The current and presumably long-term trend seems to be toward a
balance between regular and ad hoc procedures.
The Representation Procedure
Since 1919, under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, employers and workers
associations can make a representation to the International Labour Office that a
member has failed to secure the effective observance within its jurisdiction of a
convention to which it is a party. During the period from 1985 to 1995, about 30
such cases reached the Governing Body.
If the Governing Body decides that a representation is receivable, it sets up an
Examination Committee composed of members of the Governing Body chosen in
equal numbers from the government, employers, and workers groups.[36] During
its examination of the case, the Governing Body may decide to communicate this
representation to the government against which it has been made and may invite
that government to make a statement on the subject should it wish to do so. When
the Committee has completed its examination of the substance of the representa-
tion, it presents a report to the Governing Body containing its conclusions on the
issues raised and recommendations as to decisions the Governing Body should
make. When the Governing Body considers the report of the Committee, it must
invite the government concerned, if not already represented in the Governing
Body, to send a representative to take part in the proceedings, though without the
right to vote.
The final outcome of the Governing Body’s review is simply the eventual
publication of the representation and any government statement made in reply to
it.[37] This procedure is, thus, a minor and indirect sanction. The Governing Body
does not enter into the merits of the representation (for instance, by commenting
on it) or those of the measures taken by the State against whom the representation
was made. Moreover, the entire procedure remains on a political level, devoid of
any technical review, and is held in private. The Governing Body’s action simply
gives public exposure to the conduct of Member States in certain cases. In some
cases, it may recommend that the Committee of Experts continue to monitor the
situation.
The representation procedure, being soft and strictly political in complexion,
represents a preliminary but not legally necessary step in the ideally escalating
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nature of the ILO supervisory system. The ILO system provides for a much more
adversarial and technical procedure, the complaints procedure.
The Complaints Procedure
A second, more intrusive and complex adversarial procedure is contained in
Articles 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution.[38] Any member can initiate this
procedure by filing a complaint with the International Labour Office against any
other member concerning an alleged breach of a convention that both members
have ratified.[39] The procedures can also be instigated by the Governing Body
on its own initiative, or by a delegate to the Conference in his or her personal
capacity.[40]
One of the main characteristics of the ILO complaints procedure is that
the filing of a complaint does not presuppose any direct injury to the plaintiff
or, in the case of complaints filed by States, to its nationals. In fact, the ILO
conventions typically have a “collective structure.” “Bilateral structures” prevail
in those multilateral treaties that involve rights and obligations performed on a
reciprocal basis between pairs of States, as in the case of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (1963) and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(1961). “Collective structures” of obligation prevail when the nature of the rule
in question requires each party to adopt a course of conduct that is not owed to
any other individual party but is necessarily performed simultaneously toward all
other parties.[41]
Again, the obligations assumed in international law under collective agree-
ments do not represent a specific duty toward another party, but rather promote
the interest common to all parties.[42] This is typically the case with multilateral
treaties not only in the area of environmental protection but also in the field of
human rights.[43] Hence, every State that is party to a treaty concerning this type
of problem has the right to require every other party to fulfill its obligations under
the treaty and, accordingly, is deemed to be injured whenever one of those obliga-
tions is breached.[44] Given the collective nature of the obligations contained in
ILO conventions, it follows that the action of a commission of inquiry cannot be
merely limited to information provided by the parties, but that it must be endowed
with truly investigative powers.[45]
It is interesting to note that the “collective structure” of the ILO conventions
contains a paradox. The complainant State does not have to demonstrate that
it is in compliance with the convention that is the subject of its own complaint.
Furthermore, even if a State is subject to the complaints procedure, it is not pre-
vented from initiating a complaint regarding infringement of the same convention.
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This situation occurred in 1963, when a complaint was filed by Portugal against
Liberia concerning the observance of the Forced Labour Convention while a com-
plaint filed by Ghana in 1961 against Portugal was before the first Commission of
Inquiry.
In the preliminary phase of the complaints procedure, the Governing Body
communicates with the government in question.[46] After this phase, it may
appoint a commission of inquiry to consider and report on the complaint. The
Governing Body is free to decide whether or not it is appropriate to do so under the
existing circumstances.[47] There is no recourse against this decision. Clearly, the
Governing Body’s examination of the case is simply a prima facie one inasmuch
as it is not based on the merits of the complaint.
The ILO commissions of inquiry are composed of three members, who sit
in their personal capacities; members are proposed by the Director-General and
appointed by the Governing Body. It should be stressed that the parties involved in
the procedure are not consulted in this nomination. This practice is at variance with
the system used for traditional commissions of inquiry, whereby the designation
of commissioners is the exclusive prerogative of the parties to the procedure.
Usually, the members of the commissions of inquiry are judges from a high level
of jurisdiction, both national and international, and eminent scholars.[48]
The commissions of inquiry are free to decide their own procedure. How-
ever, during past 30 years of practice they have developed a well-consolidated
procedure. First, the parties involved are requested to submit to the commission
a written statement on the inquiry, called a memorial. ILO commissions of in-
quiry may ask for memorials from not only the parties involved, but also other
governments, international organizations, workers and employers organizations,
and nongovernmental organizations. The commission normally asks the parties
to submit a list of witnesses so it can decide on their relevance.
After this preliminary phase, the case is heard in camera. The representatives
of the parties involved as well as selected witnesses are heard. The represen-
tatives of the parties involved can ask the witnesses questions. In some cases,
commissions of inquiry have decided to carry out on-site visits and have requested
assistance for this purpose from the government concerned.[49] During an on-
site visit, the commission decides its own schedule and travel plans, and is not
accompanied by representatives of any party. The commissions of inquiry have
interviewed people without the presence of government representatives and have
usually asked host governments to ensure that those interviewed are not subjected
to punitive measures as a consequence of these interviews. Usually, on-site vis-
its are long and detailed in order to give the commission of inquiry all the data
necessary to write its report.
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Admittedly, the effectiveness of ILO commissions of inquiry depends heavily
on the cooperation of the governments involved. In one case a government
categorically refused to cooperate: in 1983, Poland from the very beginning
refused to work with the Commission of Inquiry established to investigate the
alleged breach of the conventions on freedom of association, claiming that the
decision of the Governing Body constituted “an interference in Poland’s internal
affairs” and that the ILO was being used “in a manner contrary to the spirit
and letter of its Constitution.”[50] The lack of cooperation by Poland did not,
however, prevent the Commission of Inquiry from making a precise evaluation
of the situation as a whole and reaching a conclusion. To bypass the Polish
government’s resistance, the Commission systematically took account of both the
information that Poland provided to and the position it adopted before other organs
of the ILO, such as the Committee on Freedom of Association, the Committee of
Experts, and the Conference Committee under the regular procedure of Article 22
of the ILO Constitution. The Commission also took account of various legislative
texts published in Poland, official and public documents, information derived from
the communications between Poland and other ILO organs, and evidence from
persons who had direct, recent experience with the trade union situation in Poland.
Hence, as the Commission of Inquiry stated in its report, neither its establishment
nor its work is conditional upon the agreement or the actual cooperation of the
State concerned.[51]
If a breach of a Convention is ascertained, the commission of inquiry may
include in its report recommendations of steps that should be taken to satisfy the
basis of the complaint.
Under Article 29(1), the report of the commission of inquiry must be com-
municated via the Director-General to the Governing Body and to each of the
governments involved in the complaint. The report must also be published. Such
reports have appeared as special issues of the ILO Official Bulletin. This commu-
nication allows the governments involved to inform the Director-General, within
three months, whether or not each of them accepts the recommendations contained
in the report of the commission. This does not mean that the ILO Constitution
makes the results of a commission of inquiry subject to the consent of the States
concerned, nor does the refusal of the recommendations by the defaulting govern-
ment affect the validity of the commission’s conclusions.[52] If the conclusions
are rejected, any of the States involved can refer the complaint to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), whose decision is final.[53] The ICJ can affirm, vary, or
reverse any of the findings or recommendations of the ILO commission of in-
quiry. Therefore, the ICJ represents a kind of final, appellate, and merely optional
jurisdiction, which comes only after recourse to a commission of inquiry.
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In the majority of cases, the governments involved have accepted the com-
mission’s report.[54] Article 33 of the ILO Constitution provides that, in the event
that a Member State fails to carry out the recommendations of the commission of
inquiry or the decisions of the ICJ within the time specified, the Governing Body
may recommend to the Conference such action as it deems wise and expedient
to secure compliance.[55] However, under Article 34, the defaulting government
can at any time inform the Governing Body that it has taken the steps necessary
to comply with the recommendations or the decision of the ICJ and can demand
a further commission of inquiry to verify its contention. If this second report is
in favor of the defaulting government, the Governing Body shall recommend the
discontinuance of any proceedings. No case has ever been referred to the ICJ, and
thus Articles 33 and 34 have not been used yet in practice.
In all cases, the commissions of inquiry have found the legislation and practice
under investigation to be contrary to the ILO conventions at issue or to the spirit
of the ILO Constitution. It has recommended the formal repeal of legislation and
discontinuance of practices found to be contrary to ILO principles.[56] It has also
recommended regular reporting, based on Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, on
the action taken to implement the recommendations contained in its report.
Finally, it should be stressed that a commission of inquiry does not play a
role in the execution of any recommendation it might make; once its report has
been communicated to the Governing Body, the commission ceases to exist as
such. The political organs of the Organization, i.e., the Governing Body and the
International Labour Conference, are responsible for pressuring the government
to put the recommendations into effect. This situation is somewhat similar to that
of Article 94.2 of the Charter of the United Nations, whereby if a party fails to
comply with a judgment of the ICJ (a technical organ that examines the merits of
the complaint), the other party may have recourse to the UN Security Council (a
political organ), which may make recommendations or decide on measures to be
taken to carry out that judgment.
A brief analysis of ILO commissions of inquiry reveals that the functions of
an ILO commission of inquiry transcend those of an ordinary inquiry commission
under general international law, as codified by the 1907 The Hague Conven-
tion.[57] Indeed, its tasks are not restricted to elucidating the facts by means of an
impartial and conscientious investigation, and to making a report, which the par-
ties are at liberty either to accept or to reject. The commission also evaluates the
legal conformity of the national practice and legislation to the ILO conventions at
issue, which does not require further approval. In other words, ILO commissions
of inquiry are quasi-judicial bodies.
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The reports of commissionsof inquiry, however, are not legally binding on the
States.[58] They can be either accepted or rejected. This aspect of the procedure
has actually induced many scholars to consider it more a conciliatory than a
judicial procedure.[59] However, the ILO procedure differs from a conciliatory
procedure under general international law by the very fact that it provides an
evaluation of the degree to which the State’s national legal practice and legislation
conform to the ILO convention. In contrast, a conciliatory procedure seeks an
outcome that is mutually satisfactory to the parties involved.[60] Moreover, the
entire procedure can be initiated either by the Governing Body or by a delegate
to the International Labour Conference.[61] Yet, the ILO procedure cannot be
considered fully judicial, because the wording of the Constitution does not require
formal acceptance of the commission of inquiry’s report by any of the parties
involved. However, since the Governing Body may, under Article 33, recommend
to the Conference “such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure
compliance,” there may be consequences for the State concerned.
It should be stressed that any fair-minded assessment of the effectiveness
of the ILO commission of inquiry must take into account the general political
atmosphere in which the action of the ILO took place. During the first 40 years of
the ILO, the regular procedure, involving the examination of the yearly reports, in
practice constituted the core of the ILO supervisory system. With the exception
of a tentative application in 1934, commissions of inquiry were almost never
used.[62] However, from the early 1960s until the end of the 1980s, the regular
supervisory system was overwhelmed, not only by the increasing number of
conventions, but also by the increasing number of Member States. It was the
very tension of those years, characterized by ideological differences and the
decolonization process, that probably pushed workers associations and certain
governments to consider some infractions as particularly serious and to address
them through a more confrontational process. Between 1960 and 1995, more than
20 complaints were filed; 9 of them were submitted by the Governing Body to a
commission of inquiry.[63] However, it is extremely significant that since 1989
no commission of inquiry has been established.[64]
Complaints submitted to commissionsof inquiry were usually only one aspect
of an adversarial political environment. The states concerned were already under
heavy political pressure from the international community for the violation of the
right to self-determination, as in the case of Portugal, or of political rights at large,
as in the cases of Greece, Chile, Poland, and Romania.[65] Other instruments
of political and economic pressure, such as sanctions against Poland, had already
been set in place. Undoubtedly, these external pressures influenced the final
outcome of the ILO procedures. If the States involved were forced back into
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compliance, it was not due to a particular measure or sanction imposed on them,
but to the effect of the larger array of measures using different procedures that were
implemented at different times by the international community as a whole. The
re-establishment of freedom of association in Poland, for instance, was clearly due
more to the political changes that took place inside Poland, with the emergence of
the Solidarity trade union movement, and in the USSR than to the specific actions
of the ILO. However, one might wonder what role international shame, echoed in
part by ILO action, played in the fall of the iron curtain.
The Freedom of Association Procedure
Along with the representation and complaints procedures there exists a third ad
hoc procedure, the so-called freedom of association procedure.[66] A special
mechanism has been set up to examine complaints of this nature. Its structure is
not contained in the text of the ILO Constitution itself, but was created in 1950
by a decision of the Governing Body and later approved by the International
Labour Conference and by the UN Economic and Social Council.[67] The main
element of this special procedure is the Governing Body Committee on Freedom
of Association, which to date has examined more than 1,800 cases. In recent
years, this nine-member tripartite Committee has been called on to deal with a
steadily growing number of complaints concerning the infringement of freedom
of association. At present, approximately 110 cases involving almost 50 States
appear on the agenda of each of its three sessions per year.[68]
The fact that freedom of association is vital for the ILO’s very existence
provides the rationale for the establishment of a special procedure. Any attack on
freedom of association is tantamount to an attack on the very structure of the ILO,
which is built on the participation of workers and employers associations, as well
as that of governments. This central feature explains why the ILO Constitution
itself, in its Preamble, and the Declaration of Philadelphia, which constitutes an
integral part thereof, consider the granting of freedom of association a general
duty inherent in ILO membership.[69] The main consequence of the special
fundamental status of freedom of association within the Organization’s basic
charter is that the freedom of association procedure can be applied not only to
those States that have ratified the relevant conventions on freedom of association,
but also to those States that have not.[70] However, in the case of States that
have not ratified the conventions on freedom of association, the Committee on
Freedom of Association can request information from the government concerned,
but no complaint will be referred to the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission
without the consent of the government.
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If this consent is not forthcoming, the Governing Body will consider taking
appropriate alternative action designed to safeguard the rights related to freedom
of association involved in the case, including measures to give full publicity to
the charges made, together with any comments by the government involved, and
to that government’s refusal to cooperate in ascertaining the facts and initiating
measures of conciliation.[71] This compromise between the classic conception of
States’ sovereignty and the attempt to oblige States to yield to a superior interest
of humankind does not reduce the deeply innovative nature of the freedom of
association procedure. Yet, unlike the representation and commission of inquiry
procedures, this second phase of the freedom of association procedure is not a
discretionary power of the ILO.
Nevertheless, the freedom of association procedure shares some features
with the representation and complaints procedures. It can be initiated either by a
Member State or by a workers or employers organization. In addition, unlike the
complaint procedure, the freedom of association procedure can also be initiated
by the International Labour Conference following the recommendation of its
Credentials Committee, or even by the government against which the allegation
of the infringement of trade union rights, for instance, is made under Article 24
of the ILO Constitution. It is worth pointing out that this is a feature that the
ILO supervisory system shares with the so-called noncompliance procedures of
multilateral environmental treaties.[72] The fact that a state can submit its own
noncompliance to the scrutiny of other members reveals that the underlining aim
of the whole procedure is to build confidence among members and to search for a
satisfactory solution rather than to allocate blame and legally sanction the breach.
Clearly, submitting oneself to the procedure would be absurd if the context were
one of mere legal responsibility.
The procedure for lodging complaints against governments and bringing
them before the Committee has been simplified in an attempt to avoid excessive
formalities; allegations can be submitted by telegram or even by postcard. Cer-
tain safeguards do exist, however. To be receivable, complaints concerning the
infringement of freedom of association must be lodged either by a State, by em-
ployers organizations, or, as almost invariably happens, by workers associations.
The latter must be a genuine workers association, not a temporary body like a
strike committee. It must be a national trade union with a direct interest at stake;
an international trade secretariat, if the issue affects one of its affiliates; or one
of the international trade union confederations having consultative status with the
ILO.[73]
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The Committee on Freedom of Association carries out a preliminary analysis
of the receivability of the compliant as to the infringement of freedom of asso-
ciation and reports to the Governing Body. The Committee’s work is conducted
in private. No representatives of the State against which the complaint has been
lodged or the workers and employers organizations that have lodged the complaint
may be present in the room during the hearings, nor can they participate in the
Committee’s deliberations.
If the Committee considers the complaint receivable, the Governing Body
can refer the case to the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission. As of 1995,
this had happened only six times.[74] The Commission is composed of nine
independent experts appointed by the Governing Body. Its task is to ascertain the
facts and, if the existence of a violation is ascertained, to report to the Governing
Body, recommending the adoption of measures it deems necessary to restore the
observance of freedom of association rights.
The functions of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission are basically
similar to those of the Inquiry Commission described above. However, in the
former the conciliatory aspect of the procedure is more evident. Indeed, the
Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission is explicitly authorized to “discuss
situations referred to it for investigation with the government concerned with a
view to securing the adjustment of difficulties by agreement.[75]
Overall, the number of cases of alleged violations of trade union rights sub-
mitted to the Committee on the Freedom of Association is far greater than the
number of representations and cases in the commissions of inquiry under the
ILO Constitution concerning nonobservance of ratified conventions.[76] The fre-
quency with which this machinery is activated has been explained by the fact that
the questions it deals with usually involve the very existence of the complainant
organization or an affiliate and arise out of a conflict between that organization
and the government of the country concerned.[77] Workers organizations have a
strong incentive to file such complaints. Indeed, many cases relate to the impris-
onment of trade unionists. Moreover, as stated above, the freedom of association
procedure may be used even where the relevant conventions have not been ratified
and where, therefore, redress through the regular procedure of supervision is not
available.
Discrimination in Employment Procedure
A fourth ad hoc procedure was established in 1973 for issues concerning equal
treatment. This procedure enables the Director-General to undertake special
studies on issues of discrimination in employment on the grounds of race, religion,
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nationality, social origin, minority status, or sex. This procedure is not limited to
those countries that have ratified the relevant conventions, but can be activated,
as the freedom of association procedure, on the basis of membership to the
Organization.[78] This procedure can be initiated by any Member State with
regard to another Member State; by employers and workers organizations (with
the same restrictions valid for the freedom of association procedure; for example,
they must be genuine workers association with a direct interest at stake); or by a
Member State with regard to questions arising within its own jurisdiction. This last
feature of the discrimination in employment procedure is very similar to features
of existing noncompliance procedures in multilateral environmental treaties.
Yet, a general survey can be carried out only if the government concerned
agrees to it. This is probably one reason that, with the exception of two attempts,
this procedure has never been used.[79] No attempt to use this procedure has
been made within the past 16 years, but it remains in force. Beginning in 1994,
the ILO Governing Body started to consider resuscitating the discrimination in
employment procedure by substantially modifying it and removing the obstacles
that prevented its use, but no firm conclusion has been reached.
The Governing Body is to continue its examination of various possible ways
to strengthen ILO supervisory procedures by, inter alia, drawing on the experience
of the freedom of association procedure in relation to the observance of the ILO
principles on nondiscrimination and forced labor. It was also to examine whether
a standing tripartite body, similar to the Committee on Freedom of Association,
should be established to handle representations and complaints under Articles 24
and 26 of the ILO Constitution. Such an innovation would be intended to reduce
the sporadic nature of deliberations typical of ad hoc bodies and to improve
the consistency of treatment of representations and complaints by eventually
developing a uniform body of case law.[80]
Direct Contacts
Although it is not strictly speaking a supervisory procedure,mention should also be
made of the so-called direct contacts procedure.[81] This procedure was officially
introduced in 1968 and revised in 1973.[82] Since the mid-1970s direct contacts
have also been resorted to in connection with cases of alleged violations of trade
union rights under examination by the Committee on Freedom of Association.[83]
The direct contacts procedure consists of on-site visits carried out in a Member
State by a representative of the Director-General at the initiative or at least with
the consent of the government concerned.[84] This procedure can be initiated
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by the Committee of Experts, the Conference Committee, the Governing Body,
or by the State involved.[85] This particular procedure was especially welcomed
by those States that were to benefit from it. In fact, it has been initiated more
frequently by governments than by the supervisory bodies.[86]
The majority of direct contacts have been undertaken by ILO officials, but in
several instances (particularly when some technical or major policy issues were
involved) they have been entrusted to an independent expert accompanied by an
ILO official.[87] This procedure usually involves discussions with representatives
of the government concerned and officials of various government services who
have direct responsibility for the questions at issue. Depending on the nature
of the case, they may also involve discussions with members of the judiciary or
special bodies involved in the settlement of labor disputes, individual employers
and workers, and recruiting agents.
It should be emphasized that the direct contacts procedure does not in any
way replace or limit the responsibilities of the established supervisory bodies.
Thus, where the request for direct contacts arises from comments by the Com-
mittee of Experts or the Conference Committee, it remains the responsibility of
these Committees to examine, using the new information obtained through the
direct contacts, the extent to which conformity has been secured concerning the
obligations of the Member State involved. However, while these contacts are
taking place, the supervisory bodies suspend their examinations of cases for a
period normally not exceeding one year in order to take account of the outcome
of these contacts.[88]
In practice, direct contacts have performed three functions.[89] In many
instances they have constituted a form of technical assistance, providing advice to
Member States on how to comply with the requirements under ILO conventions
or on the regular procedure described in Article 22.[90] In some cases, direct
contacts have involved fact-finding, which enables the Committee of Experts
to reach its conclusions and submit its reports with due regard to all relevant
considerations.[91] Finally, where major problems or conflicting views between
a government and ILO supervisory bodies have existed, direct contacts have
provided the opportunity for a more complete explanation of the considerations
underlying the positions adopted by each party. Instead of public criticism by
the supervisory bodies, quiet diplomacy can be given a limited period of time in
which to work.[92] Direct contacts, in short, represent a highly flexible technique
that, nonetheless, possesses serious potential for development.[93]
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Some Lessons for Multilateral
Environmental Agreements
The ILO is often considered to be effective in the protection of human rights.
In recognition of its achievements, the ILO was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
in 1969. Such a remarkable achievement owes much to the ILO’s ability to
improve compliance with ILO commitments, namely, the implementation of ILO
conventions. From 1964 to 1995, the supervisory bodies of the ILO registered
2,107 cases of progress, that is, instances where national legislation and practice
were changed to meet the requirements of a ratified convention following reports
by supervisory bodies.[94] Although this figure does not reveal those cases
where States modified their legislation before or shortly after the ratification of a
convention, it nevertheless reflects the deterrent value of supervision.[95]
Indeed, the existence of a supervisory system may discourage States from
violating international standards; this holds for all international commitments,
whether in the field of human rights, environment, trade, or disarmament. Yet, as
in the environmental field, the cause-and-effect relationship in the area of human
rights is difficult to measure. Too many factors influence progress in the field
to make it possible to precisely document the role of international supervisory
systems.[96]
Some scholars and the ILO itself have undertaken studies of the impact
of ILO supervision.[97] Although these studies may lack precise mathematical
proof, they nevertheless support the general view that the ILO supervisory system
has been relatively successful. The reasons for this success are various and are
still the subject of debate.[98]
The ILO and environmental regimes differ greatly in their aims, structure, and
historical development. Lessons cannot easily be transferred from one to another.
Keeping this in mind, an attempt will be made to determine which characteris-




It should be stressed that the ILO compliance monitoring system is evolution-
ary.[100] Its growth over the years, as it has worked to enhance its effectiveness,
bears witness to the vitality of the system. Efforts have been made to streamline
the reporting system; to promote more direct dialogue with Member States, both
individually and at the regional level; and to tap the knowledge and experience of
employers and workers in support of national and international measures to imple-
ment ILO standards.[101] Thus, the system has evolved to its present state on the
basis of the demand for effective supervision. Moreover, additional supervisory
procedures, especially the more confrontational ad hoc procedures, were added
only as Member States had experience with supervision and gained confidence in
it over time.
Some environmental regimes are also evolutionary, or at least have this
potential.[102] Their constituent instruments contain all the necessary provisions
to allow them to evolve over time in order to react to new scientific certainties.[103]
However, although both the ILO system and these environmental regimes are
endowed with comparable provisions for flexibility, they do not have, nor could
have, comparable histories. The ILO has evolved over almost 80 years. It has
withstood the tensions of a sharply bipolar world in which different conceptions
of human rights, among other conflicts, have played a key role.
Concerning the issue of supervisory procedures more specifically, it should be
stressed that instances of supervisory mechanisms in multilateral environmental
treaties are quite rare, and cases of evolutionary supervisory procedures in this
particular area are even scarcer. Among these few instances, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) stands out for its capacity to
grow and adapt. Over the more than 20 years it has been in existence CITES
has developed an elaborate, comprehensive, and, to a certain extent, effective
system of supervision starting from a few sketchy provisions on the Conference
of the Parties and the Secretariat.[104] Currently, the Secretariat and the Parties,
consider more than 100 cases of alleged violations annually.[105] Within this
remarkably elaborate system of supervision, non-State actors play a major role by
analyzing and managing data on trade of wildlife specimens and identifying areas
of inadequate implementation.
Yet, as the ILO experience teaches, time is a critical element when judging
the flexibility of international regimes. This is why, beyond any legal evaluation
of the constituent instruments, it is impossible to definitively evaluate the actual
ability of recent environmental regimes to evolve over time. However, the ILO
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experience indicates that with time and constructive attention, supervisory systems
can become more effective, even from modest beginnings.
Consistency in Development
Although ILO supervisory procedures have undergone changes and adaptations,
the essential principles underlying these procedures, which are aimed at ensur-
ing impartial assessments and confidence in their objectivity, have been fully
maintained.[106] After 77 years of constant development, the ILO Constitution
remains the fundamental juridical instrument for all of the ILO’s supervisory ma-
chinery. Therefore, the same supervisory system is valid for all ILO conventions
and is legally binding for all Member States; the authority of the entire system
flows from a single source.[107] Although the ILO has adopted a considerable
number of conventions and recommendations, it has a single system of supervision
that applies to all of them, with the notable exception of the specialized Committee
on Freedom of Association. Compared with an alternative system of fragmented
supervision tailored to specific commitments and legal instruments, the unity of
the ILO system has probably streamlined the overall procedure, reduced costs,
and increased the overall effectiveness of the system.
The ILO supervisory system is a cohesive structure that employs a wide ar-
ray of measures, all designed to persistently pressure States to comply with their
obligations. The various measures are interrelated and are integrated into the
work of the ILO as a whole. Thus, the main lesson is that, whereas carefully
negotiated regimes can enjoy the benefit of a coherent normative system over
time, framework conventions risk engendering erratic growth of functions, com-
petencies, and contradictory aims of the regime’s organs. More specifically, in the
case of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the fast-paced process of
negotiating an agreement in time for the UN Conference on the Environment and
Development (UNCED) left the Conference of the Parties with many unresolved
issues related to the design and operation of the Convention’s institutions. The
costs of this hurrying in terms of increased intricacy and bureaucracy of both the
negotiating process after Berlin and the future functioning of the Convention are
not yet clear. The risk is the loss of a coherent and efficient set of institutions,
negotiated in parallel with the Convention’s commitments and Protocols. There-
fore, although much attention is now focused on the development of Protocols,
the ILO experience strongly suggests that regime institutions should be developed
with as much of a common and consistent core as possible.
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Techniques of Dispute Settlement and Enforcement
The ILO system comprises many existing techniques for dispute avoidance and
settlement, ranging from diplomatic to quasi-judicial and judicial means. Re-
cently, the Director-General of the ILO proposed enlarging the set of means avail-
able to include permanent access to mediation and voluntary arbitration.[108]
Such a wide choice of means and the possibility of their coordinated use are
among the most important features of the ILO system. Specifically, the combined
use of diplomacy and censure over time has proved fairly effective.[109] On
the one hand, publicity is given to reports drawn up by the supervisory bodies
and the related discussions at international meetings; on the other hand, the ILO
makes contacts with governments and employers and workers organizations. In
this context, publicity plays a key role. It facilitates collective review and mu-
tual accountability by all Member States and even more importantly it exposes
government reports to public scrutiny through non-State actors.[110]
Another lesson from the ILO experience is that, in the most difficult cases,
noncomplying States can be brought back into compliance only through broad,
concerted international action that is not limited to those measures provided by
one specific regime. As the case of the Commission of Inquiry established for
investigating Poland’s violation of the freedom of association conventions shows,
States that are determined not to comply cannot be forced to comply by the
diplomatic sanctions envisaged in the ILO system. If Poland was ultimately
brought back into compliance, it was probably not the direct result of any specific
ILO action. Yet, it is undeniable that international pressure to end human rights
violations in Eastern Europe, which was catalyzed in part by ILO actions, played
a role in Poland’s ultimate compliance.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, multilateral environmental treaties have
usually contained detailed provisions on a wide array of dispute settlement means
ranging from mere negotiations to conciliation or judicial settlement, through an
arbitral tribunal or the ICJ. This is the case, for example, for the Protocol on Envi-
ronmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, the Rio Conventions (the Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention on Biolog-
ical Diversity), the Desertification Convention, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe Conventions (Convention on Environmental Impact As-
sessment in a Transboundary Context, the Convention on the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents, and the Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes), the Convention on the
Protection of the Baltic Sea Area, and the North-East Atlantic Convention.[111]
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To date, the dispute settlement procedures in multilateral environmental
treaties have never actually been used. Yet this does not reduce their impor-
tant deterrent value. The fact that they have never been used is partially explained
by the observation that almost no State has an environmental record so clean that
it can afford to criticize another State without fear of a counterclaim. However,
whereas States may fear counterclaims, NGOs, and perhaps also international or-
ganizations, do not.[112] This could be a further argument in favor of a stronger
role for non-State entities in compliance monitoring and enforcement procedures.
A System of Supervision
The system of national reports and the ability to use these reports to compare
legislation and practice with ILO standards is the backbone of the ILO supervisory
system. The reports are the starting point for the regular procedure of supervision,
which is where most of the supervisory work takes place. Among the different
procedures available, the regular supervisory procedure has achieved the greatest
results and probably will continue to be at the core of the ILO’s supervisory
system.[113] By preventing disputes, the regular supervisory procedures fulfill
the general purpose of enhancing compliance with international obligations. In
fact, the ultimate goal of control procedures in general, and of the ILO procedures
in particular, is to make comments designed to encourage dialogue and cooperation
and to help states to get back into compliance, rather than to allocate blame and
criticism.[114]
One of the greatest assets of the ILO supervisory machinery is that it offers a
continuum of procedures, from the regular to the ad hoc systems.[115] The joining
of regular and ad hoc procedures is not completely unknown in environmental
treaties.[116] Yet, despite the potentially relevant role of ad hoc procedures, for
the above mentioned reasons, the procedures available under Articles 24 to 34 of
the ILO Constitution (e.g., use of commissions of inquiry) and the special freedom
of association procedure will probably remain reserve mechanisms used only in a
limited number of cases, particularly when fact-finding is required.[117] Still, the
mere existence of these procedures could play a deterrent role, providing added
inducement to respond to routine supervision.[118]
Several multilateral environmental treaties contain provisions for the estab-
lishment of regular review procedures that are similar to the ILO regular procedure
in many respects.[119] Yet, the ILO supervisory system has gone one step beyond
by creating a detailed procedure for handling issues and questions that arise from
national reports.[120] The ability to handle such specific issues has contributed
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to the effectiveness of ILO supervision. This suggests that environmental treaties
in general, and those that provide for the establishment of noncompliance proce-
dures in particular, should necessarily develop a procedure to effectively identify
and address the many compliance issues that arise during the regular review of
national reports.
Finally, it should be stressed that one of the main advantages of endowing
a regime with supervisory procedures that deal systematically with compliance
by Member States is that information from the supervisory process can be used
to adjust the regime standards over time. Knowing why States fail to comply is
helpful for creating standards that are less likely to be violated.
Particular Nature of Supervised Norms
Flexibility of Norms
The reasons for the ILO’s high degree of effectiveness relate not only to the flexi-
bility of its supervisory procedure, but also to the particular features of the norms
whose implementation is monitored. Indeed, it must be remembered that ILO
instruments basically set minimum standards.[121] In other words, ILO conven-
tions merely set the general framework. The desire for flexibility in the framing of
international labor conventions has been reflected in the Constitution since 1919
and has prompted many of the flexibility clauses included in ILO conventions [for
example, the possibility of opting for one or several parts of a convention; limiting
the scope of a convention either with regard to certain categories of individuals or
enterprises (ratione personae) or with regard to the territory (ratione territorii);
and choosing between different techniques of protection and application].[122]
This is particularly so for the more technical standards.
Most of the recent multilateral environmental treaties do not have compara-
ble flexibility. Since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in
1982, multilateral environmental treaties have increasingly adopted the practice
of creating a “package deal,” therefore excluding reservations.[123] Usually,
the rationale for such rigidity is found in the observation that, as a general rule,
environmental treaties concern matters common to all parties. Therefore, their
common application to all Member States is considered to be a basic requirement.
Yet such an argument holds for ILO conventions, too. As the ILO experience
proves, allowing some flexibility can bring wider acceptance of quite stringent
standards. This could be a good compromise between treaties with stringent
commitments but low ratification rates (for example, some MARPOL annexes)
and “loose” conventions with universal acceptance (for example, the Framework
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Convention on Climate Change). The balance point may vary considerably in
different treaties, thus making it difficult to infer from the ILO experience any
general rule applicable to all environmental treaties. Yet it is undeniable that some
flexibility could promote wider acceptance of stringent international obligations.
Consensus on Norms
The International Labour Conference adopts conventions and recommendations.
Selected subjects are placed on the agenda of the Conference by the decision of the
Governing Body.[124] The technical preparation that precedes and accompanies
the framing of ILO standards helps to ensure that an international instrument
will only be adopted once its subject matter has reached a sufficient degree of
development and is considered important. By the time they come into being,
ILO standards usually have already achieved a high degree of consensus, partly
because they need a two-thirds majority to be adopted by the Conference, and
partly because government, employers, and workers delegates participate actively
in the work.[125] However, this is no guarantee of wide ratification.
To summarize, the ILO experience shows that a high degree of consensus and
flexibility in how conventions can be applied might help to ensure high overall
impact of a standard.
Particular Features of ILO Committees on Implementation
Limited Membership Committees
The ILO Committees and Commissions that supervise the implementation of
standards illustrate the benefits of delegating such functions to small, specialized
bodies. This suggests that when parties to multilateral environmental treaties
want such functions to be performed, they should create specialized commit-
tees to perform them rather than give the responsibility to much larger bodies
with already crowded agendas and large, open-ended membership. Restricted
committees for reviewing the implementation of commitments are quite rare in
multilateral environmental agreements. Although the Implementation Committee
of the Montreal Protocol and the Implementation Committee of the Oslo Protocol
have a restricted membership (10 and 8 members, respectively), the Subsidiary
Body on Implementation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Committee for Environmental Protection of the Protocol on Environmental Pro-
tection of the Antarctic Treaty, and the Commission of the North-East Atlantic
Treaty, just to name a few, are open-ended.[126]
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Moreover, the influence and effectiveness of the small ILO Committee of
Experts and the larger but standing Conference Committee derive from their
ability to serve as legitimate forums for raising, debating, and resolving issues.
Most issues are disposed of in these bodies under the regular procedures for
supervision, leaving only the most difficult questions for debate in the larger,
politically oriented International Labour Conference or for referral to the ad hoc
procedures.
Balance between Technical and Political Bodies
The division of functions between the Committee of Experts and the Conference
Committee has been another key to the success of the ILO supervisory system.
The expert body is composed of individuals chosen for their independence and
competence. The representative bodies, where the decision-making authority
ultimately lies, comprise representatives of governments, workers, and employers.
The equilibrium between the technical and political bodies makes it possible
to maintain a desirable balance in the treatment of cases. In this sense, the
role assigned to employers and workers organizations, both in the framing of
international standards and in the control of their implementation, is a particularly
important factor in maintaining the dynamism of ILO supervision.[127]
The noncompliance procedures of the Montreal and the Oslo Protocols,
though also characterized by a two-step approach, do not maintain the same
division between technical and political bodies. In fact, their Implementation
Committees, like the Subsidiary Body on Implementation of the Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, the Commission of the North-East Atlantic Treaty,
and the Committee for Environmental Protection of the Protocol on Environmen-
tal Protection of the Antarctic Treaty, are composed of Member States and not
independent experts.[128]
Active Role of the International Labour Office
The ILO experience shows that the effective work of supervisory bodies is heavily
dependent on assistance from the secretariat. For instance, in 1995 the Committee
of Experts was supposed to review 2,290 detailed reports during its three-week
session. The International Labour Office has provided the necessary resources to
develop a large and competent staff within the International Labour Department
to support the work of the supervisory organs.
The preparatory work of the Committee of Experts is carried out by some 40
officials in the International Labour Standards Department. Among their other
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tasks, the ILO officials examine each State’s report. If a discrepancy is believed
to exist between the convention at issue and national law and practice, the ILO
officials draft a comment for submission to the member of the Committee of
Experts responsible for that particular convention. The Expert can accept the
comments as drafted or make whatever changes are considered necessary. The
draft comments as approved or modified by the Expert are then presented to the
whole Committee for approval.
Considering the immense work load of supervisory bodies, the number of ILO
personnel devoted to the supervisory procedure is relatively small, amounting to
an estimated 5% of the whole organization. Yet supervision is a core function
on which much of ILO’s effectiveness depends. The costs of supervision appear
remarkably low in comparison with those of the other functions of developing
and maintaining legal regimes. Furthermore, because of the economies of scale in
building an integrated supervisory system, increasing the number of obligations to
be supervised may be accompanied by declining marginal costs of such activities.
Therefore, according to the ILO experience, reluctance to develop supervisory
procedures because of the financial costs does not appear to be justified.
Participation of Non-State Actors
The ILO is probably the only international organization in existence that is open
to all States and that gives non-State actors a full standing on an equal footing
with States.[129] Non-State actors have equal representation in the plenary organ
(the International Labour Conference) and in the executive organ (the Governing
Body). They can initiate all ad hoc procedures and participate in all major ILO
committees, notably the Conference Committee. The main exception to the full
standing of non-State actors in the ILO system is the Financial Committee of
the Conference, which manages the ILO’s budget.[130] However, considering
that only States contribute financially to the Organization’s budget, excluding
non-State actors from this committee is still compatible with the ILO’s tripartite
spirit.
Non-State actors are allowed to play a key role in the supervisory procedure,
primarily because they play a role in the adoption of the international standards
whose implementation is to be monitored. This suggests that it could be politi-
cally awkward to involve non-State actors in systems of supervision on an equal
footing with States if they were not fully involved in shaping and adopting those
commitments whose implementation is monitored. This lesson from the ILO ex-
perience might encourage future environmental regimes to allow non-State actors
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a greater role in their functioning. However, it also suggests that existing regimes
should carefully consider enlarging participation once they have started working
at full capacity.
ILO practice shows that non-State entities play a key role in the functioning
of the ILO supervisory system. One hundred twenty-one of 159 observations
under the regular procedure, 6 of 9 cases before ILO commissions of inquiry, and
fairly all representations and cases under the freedom of association procedure
were initiated by non-State actors.[131] Therefore, it is not rash to assert that if
non-State entities were not granted a role in the ILO compliance control mecha-
nism the entire system of supervision probably would be nearly ineffective and
obsolete. Notably, non-State actors have made major contributions by comment-
ing on government reports, providing the debate within the ILO with precious
factual information. Workers associations, in particular, have the best firsthand
information and the strongest direct incentives to pursue violations of ILO con-
ventions. This explains why such groups have initiated the great majority of cases
under the ad hoc procedures. Moreover, their participation tends to depoliticize
the system of supervision.[132]
These particular lessons from the ILO experience should be applied to other
regimes with due caution. Even within the domain of the international protection
of human rights, direct participation of non-State actors within the regime’s insti-
tutions is still quite limited. The main exception is the Additional Protocol to the
European Social Charter, signed on 9 November 1995, which would introduce
a system for complaints that is similar to, though more open than, the system
existing in the ILO.[133]
Since its founding in 1919, the ILO, because of its philosophy and the fore-
sight of one of its founders and first Director-General, Albert Thomas, has given
a legitimate and formal place to workers and employers associations.[134] Their
participation was conceived to be and, as has been shown, is still essential to
the effectiveness of international labor standards. Multilateral environmental
agreements, however, generally do not have the same integral connection with
non-State actors, although such actors might play a major role in putting envi-
ronmental issues on the agenda and creating public pressure for action or, as in
the case of CITES, play a major operational role in monitoring compliance and
providing expert advice.
One reason for this widespread wariness of full participation of non-State
actors in the supervision of the implementation of international commitments is
the potentially enormous number of “complainants.” During the past decade,
the number of NGOs, environmental NGOs in particular, has increased remark-
ably.[135] Undeniably, the ILO could potentially face an equally large number
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of non-State actors and consequently see its supervisory bodies flooded by appli-
cants. Yet, this has not happened. The ILO has effectively managed the problem
by limiting access to procedures. For instance, access to the freedom of association
procedure is limited to genuine workers associations and is denied to temporary
bodies such as strike committees. Moreover, the associations must be either na-
tional trade unions with a direct interest at stake; international trade secretariats,
if the issue affects one of their affiliates; or one of the international trade union
confederations having consultative status with the ILO.[136] Finally, whereas
other human rights regimes allow individuals to file complaints (for example, the
European Court of Human Rights), the ILO system does not.
The full participation of non-State actors in the ILO is restricted to repre-
sentatives of employers and workers organizations. Within the ILO, workers
organizations play an extremely active role, but their concerns are not always
the same as those of human rights NGOs. The major human rights NGOs (for
example, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and
Anti-Slavery International) are significantly less involved in ILO activities than in
other human rights regimes. They do not lobby in the corridors at ILO meetings
and the ILO does not sufficiently encourage information from, consultation with,
and participation by such groups. Because they cannot play an active role within
the highly formalized procedures of the ILO, human rights organizations have
generally shown little interest in the Organization.
To summarize, as the ILO case shows, granting full standing within an or-
ganization to all stakeholders and allowing non-State actors to have standing in
compliance control procedures, though limited in some way, could enhance the
implementation of international commitments. Moreover, the ILO has reached
a good compromise between universal access and overall exclusion of non-State
actors, which with changes could be applied to multilateral environmental treaties.
The States’ die-hard wariness of non-State actors, therefore, cannot be justified in
light of the results achieved in the ILO experience provided that full implementa-
tion of commitments is a fundamental interest of States.
A Continuous Flow of Information
The ILO is characterized by a continuous and free flow of information from
non-State entities and States to the ILO, and from the ILO to States and non-
State entities. Special rules have been adopted requiring governments to circulate
reports and other official ILO documents to employers and workers groups in
their countries for the purpose of soliciting their observations, improving the
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flow of information, and making it easier for those groups to participate on a
well-informed basis.[137]
This constant dialogue on the shaping of standards and their content, and on
the implementation of commitments between all stakeholders helps to prevent
disputes or to have them addressed at an early stage by calling attention to cases
of noncompliance. Moreover, acquainting NGOs with the framing of standards
may, over time, reduce the number of cases brought before supervisory organs.
The direct involvement of non-State actors in settling international obligations
might play a key role in enhancing the effectiveness of the whole system. As the
experience of the ozone regime illustrates, environmental decisions often have
an enormous impact on the business community. Widespread consultation with
industry might therefore be necessary, both to provide factual information about
the problem and to work out the practical difficulties of compliance.[138]
Technical Assistance
Efforts to increase confidence in ILO supervision have included providing assis-
tance to Member States in order to implement ILO standards. The ILO pursues an
active partnership policy that involves working closely with all three constituents
in each country in order to ensure that national objectives are identified and served
in terms of both labor standards and technical cooperation.[139] These procedures
are, by their very nature, extremely flexible and appear to possess considerable
growth potential.
The ILO works directly in the field to provide explanations, advice, and as-
sistance on matters related to the supervision of commitments. It posts advisers
on international labor standards in regional offices and organizes seminars and
regional reviews of conventions.[140] These services are offered in response to
specific requests received from governments or from workers or employers orga-
nizations, as well as through routine advisory missions and informal discussions
initiated by the Office. Technical assistance is an inducement for States to be
more receptive to the standard-setting work of the ILO. However, its impact on
the implementation record of ILO standards cannot be easily assessed. Indeed, the
withdrawal of technical assistance has not yet been used by the ILO as a sanction
for failure to implement labor standards; the Governing Body has indeed rejected
suggestions to do so.[141]
Some multilateral environmental agreements also provide for the supply of
technical assistance. For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the
Framework Convention on Climate Change impose a general duty on Member
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States for the promotion of research, training, public education, and general
awareness.[142] Because these conventions are relatively new, however, it is
still impossible to draw any meaningful conclusion about their actual capacity
to implement these provisions. To a large extent, this ability will depend on the
financial resources that Member States provide within the context of the regime.
Yet, the ILO experience clearly indicates the way multilateral environmental
regimes must go if they want to meaningfully improve their implementation
record. In the long run, the actions of an environmentally aware public are the only
effective means to address environmental problems. Still, the relatively limited
role non-State actors can play in existing environmental regimes significantly
reduces the extent to which this ILO experience can be borrowed.
On-Site Visits
The direct contacts procedure is more formal than the provision of technical assis-
tance. It is essentially a means for dialogue between the ILO and Member States,
for advice, and, in certain cases, even for investigation and conciliation. More
specifically, under the direct contacts procedure problems affecting the ratifica-
tion or implementation of conventions or the discharge of related obligations by a
Member State can be examined by a representative of the ILO Director-General
and representatives of the State concerned. Admittedly, if governments have in-
creasingly accepted visits from ILO commissions or representatives, it is largely
because of the objectivity and impartiality of their work.[143] It might be also due
to the benefits that can be derived from the findings and recommendations of an
independent and impartial body of observers; to the opportunity such visits pro-
vide for refuting unjustified accusations; to the desire not to appear to implicitly
accept the charges made against them by rejecting the inquiry; and to the weight
of national and international opinion.[144]
The Framework Convention on Climate Change has developed a somewhat
similar procedure of “country visits,” which so far has been quite successful.[145]
Similarly, the aim of the Climate Change “review teams” is to assess the level of
implementation of States’ commitments by holding a series of discussions with
the government team that worked on the national report (“communication” in the
Climate Change jargon). Moreover, review teams also meet with representatives
of environmental and business NGOs and the scientific and technical community,
which provide their own reports to the review teams. As in the case of the
ILO, the country visits have generated great interest within the host countries
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and have helped to spread information on measures, insights, innovations, and
methodologies at all levels.
On-site visits may help to build confidence in the whole process of imple-
mentation and supervision, which ultimately will lead to better cooperation and
openness toward country visits. Hopefully, Climate Change country visits will
follow the ILO example and develop beyond the mere monitoring function to
become a part of a continuous source of technical advice to ensure that national
commitments are identified and served in terms of both reduction measures and
technical cooperation.
Slowness
ILO supervisory procedures, despite their praiseworthy flexibility, are not able
to rapidly overcome serious discrepancies in the application of ratified conven-
tions.[146] For instance, the average length of time between the filing of a
complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution and its disposal is three years.
The reason for this slowness is that the ILO supervisory system consists, in gen-
eral, of a two-tiered examination of cases, first by a technical body and then by
a political body, where the decision-making power ultimately rests. An ad hoc
technical body can operate constantly, but the political bodies usually meet at fixed
dates: the Governing Body in regular session twice a year and the International
Labour Conference once a year. The main exception to this drawback of the ILO
supervisory system is the direct contacts procedure, which can be at any time but
nevertheless has only limited effectiveness.
The Committee on Freedom of Association, which meets three times a year,
has developed a special procedure for dealing with urgent cases. These are
cases “involving human life or personal freedom, or new or changing conditions
affecting the freedom of action of a trade union movement as a whole, and cases
arising out of a continuing state of emergency and cases involving the dissolution
of an organization.”[147] The Committee gives priority to such cases and makes
a special request to the government involved to give a particularly rapid reply to
the allegations. Yet, even many urgent cases seem to require an extremely long
period for consideration by the Committee on Freedom of Association.[148]
Undoubtedly, the strongest weapons of the ILO supervisory system are perse-
verance and patience. Year after year, the ILO Governing Body continues to point
out instances of noncompliance until the cases are satisfactorily resolved. For
instance, in the case of Chile’s noncompliance with the freedom of association
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obligations, from 1975 until 1990, without interruption, the Governing Body
urged the Chilean government to amend its legislation.
Yet, because of the characteristics of environmental problems (which are
often from non-point sources and which are cumulative and cause irreversible
damage) and because of the need in some cases to give swift answers to possible
environmental emergencies, multilateral environmental treaties must develop pro-
cedures that can rapidly identify and address cases of noncompliance by Member
States. Constant noncompliance with environmental obligations over long peri-
ods of time by a few States might, ultimately, offset the efforts of the majority
of States. Therefore, whereas in the field of international protection of human
rights time is a precious, and sometimes the only, ally, in the protection of the
environment it represents a major handicap.
The frequent sluggishness experienced with multilateral environmental treaties
could be partly compensated for by including provisions concerning interim mea-
sures to be taken while a case is pending before the organs charged with monitoring
the implementation of the convention or the settlement of disputes. However, de-
spite their undeniable usefulness, such provisions are still quite rare in multilateral
environmental treaties. Among the few instances, one might recall the 1958 Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas
and the more recent 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and 1995 Straddling
Fish Stocks Agreement.[149]
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[23] There was also a fourth minor adjustment in 1979; according to this change, if a
State ratifies a convention that introduces more stringent standards than a precedent
convention on the same issue, the State is obliged to submit a report only on the
more recent instrument. For additional information on the three procedure reviews,
see GB 142/205 (1959); GB 210/14/32 (1976); GB 258/LILS/6/1 (1993).
[24] The 1993 adjustment was first applied in 1995. See GB 258/6/19.
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[25] That Member States have not simply terminated these conventions by, for instance,
a resolution of the International Labour Conference adopted by consensus is ex-
plained by the fact that the ILO Constitution does not yet provide for this. The
possible adoption of an amendment to permit termination is under discussion. See
International Labour Organization, Governing Body, Report of the Committee on
Legal Issues and International Labour Standards, GB. 265/8/2, Geneva, Switzer-
land, March 1996. The termination of conventions on the international level would
also require revision of the domestic legislation adopted to implement these conven-
tions. New intervention by the legislative power is, therefore, required to abrogate
this domestic law. Given the great load of work of modern legislative bodies, this
does not seem to be a viable option.
[26] Some 480 reports, due for those conventions applicable to nonmetropolitan terri-
tories, should be added to this figure. See Report, 1995, at par. 88.
[27] In 1994 this figure was 68.7%. See Report, 1995, at par. 86 and 87.
[28] See Leary, V.A., Lessons from the experience of the International Labour Organi-
zation, in P. Alston, ed., The United Nations and Human Rights, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, UK, 1992, pp. XII–765, at p. 597.
[29] Article 7 of the Standing Orders, annex to the ILO Constitution.
[30] Article 65 of the Standing Orders, annex to the ILO Constitution. (Under Article
57 of the Standing Orders, the Committee elects the Chair, two Vice-Chairs, and
one Rapporteur from among each of the three groups.)
[31] As of 1957, the Committee of Experts has adopted the practice of using a “special
list” to bring to the Conference’s attention cases where governments met serious
difficulties in discharging their obligations. See International Labour Organization,
Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, International Labour
Office, Geneva, Switzerland, 1957, at p. 657, par. 30. For more information
about the Committee’s role, see International Labour Organization, Handbook of
Procedures Relating to International Labour Conventions and Recommendations,
International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland, 1995, par. 58.
[32] In a few cases concerning comments during the 1980s on the legislation of East
European countries, members from Poland and the USSR dissented from the Com-
mittee’s findings. For more information on the effect of time constraints, see Adam,
R., Attivita’ normative e di controllo dell’ OIL ed evoluzione della comunita´ inter-
nazionale, Giuffre`, Milan, Italy, 1993, at p. 145; and Landy, The Effectiveness of
International Supervision, op. cit., at p. 51.
[33] In 1974 the report was not approved because it highlighted the USSR’s failure to
implement the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) of 1930. In 1977, a controversy
over the application of ILO conventions in the territories occupied by Israel was the
primary factor behind the report’s not being adopted. In 1982, an issue involving
the Conference Committee on Resolutions spilled over to the International Labour
Conference and caused the absence of the necessary quorum. See Leary, op. cit.,
at p. 601.
[34] See Report, 1995, at p. 78.
[35] See Report, 1994, at p. 11.
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[36] See International Labour Organization, Standing Orders concerning the Procedure
for the Examination of Representations under Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution
of the ILO (Article 3), adopted by the Governing Body at its 212th (March 1980)
Session.
[37] See Constitution of the International Labour Organization, (Article 25).
[38] For an in-depth analysis of the ILO Inquiry Commission,see Llanos Mardones, H.I.,
The International Labour Organization’s Commission of Inquiry, IUHEI, Memoire
pre´sente´ en vue de l’obtention du Certificat d’ ´Etudes Internationales, Geneva,
Switzerland, 1990. For a case study, see Manin, A., La commission d’enqueˆte
de l’Organisation internationale du travail institue´e pour examiner l’observation
de la Convention no. 111 par la Re´publique Fe´de´rale d’Allemagne: de nouveau
enseignements?, Annuaire Franc¸ais de Droit International, vol. 34, ´Editions du
CNRS, Paris, France, 1988, pp. 365–381.
[39] When the ILO Constitution was being drafted at the Paris Peace Conference in
1919, a British proposal was made in which this condition of ratification by both
parties did not exist. Instead, this proposal alluded to “any Convention.” This
position almost prevailed, but finally the Drafting Committee replaced that phrase
with “which both have ratified.” See Zarras, op. cit., at p. 266.
[40] To date, just two such Commissions have been appointed by decision of the Gov-
erning Body. The first case initiated by the executive organ occurred in 1974
against Chile; the second was in 1985 against the Federal Republic of Germany. It
should also be stressed that in the case concerning the observance by the Dominican
Republic and Haiti of the Conventions on Forced Labour (Nos. 29 and 105), on
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (No. 87), and on the
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (No. 98), filed by several Conference
delegates, the Governing Body “   in the light of the allegations concerning mal-
practices in the payment of wages made in the complaint    ,” by its own initiative
decided that the Commission of Inquiry should also examine the observance by the
Dominican Republic of the Protection of Wages Convention of 1949 (No. 95). See,
International Labour Organization, Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Haiti and
Dominican Republic, ILO Official Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, Special Supplement, 1983,
par. 9.b. To date, five of nine complaints examined by a commission of inquiry
have been initiated by a delegate to the Conference.
[41] Some scholars have argued that international labor conventions not only bind States
among themselves, but also legally bind each State to the Organization. See, Ørsted,
H.C., Revisionen af de Internationale Arbejts Konventionen, Nordisk Tidsskrift for
international Ret, vol. 2, 1931, pp. 3–20, at p. 14.
[42] On the notion of “collective interests,” see Riphagen, W., State responsibility: New
theories of obligation in interstate relations, in R.St.J. MacDonald and D.M. John-
ston, eds., The Structure and Process of International Law, Nijhoff, The Hague,
Netherlands, 1983, pp. 581–625, at p. 600; and Vadapalas, V., L’inte´reˆt pour agir en
responsabilite´ internationale, Polish Yearbook of International Law, vol. 20, 1993,
pp. 17–35. On the applicability of the concept of “collective interest” in multilat-
eral environmental treaties, see Sachariew, K., State responsibility for multilateral
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treaty violations: Identifying the ‘injured state’ and its legal status, Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 35, 1988, pp. 273–289; and Charney, J.I.,
Third state remedies for environmental damage to the world’s common spaces, in
F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi, eds., International Responsibility for Environmental
Harm, Graham and Trotman, London, UK, 1991, pp. 149–177.
[43] Two other examples of treaties characterized by a multilateral structure of obliga-
tions are treaties in the field of disarmament and those on trade issues. However,
these two particular categories of treaties can also have a strong bilateral compo-
nent.
[44] See Article 5(2)(e)(ii) of Part Two of the International Law Commission’s Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, as provisionally adopted, Yearbook of the Inter-
national Law Commission, vol. II (Part II), 1985, at p. 25. Various commissions
of inquiry of the ILO have underscored this point on several occasions. See, in-
ter alia, International Labour Organization, Report of the Commission of Inquiry:
Ghana–Portugal, ILO Official Bulletin, Vol. XLV, no. 2, Suppl. II, International
Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland, April 1962, p. 244; International Labour Or-
ganization, Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Portugal–Liberia, ILO Official
Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, no. 2, Suppl. II, International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzer-
land, April 1963, p. 173. Judge Jessup, in his dissenting opinion in the South West
Africa cases, quoted the ILO Commission of Inquiry on the Ghana–Portugal case,
“The fact which this case establishes is that a State may have a legal interest in the
observance, in the territories of another State, of general welfare treaty provisions
   .” It is, in short, a truly “   legal interest of States in general humanitarian
causes    .” See International Court of Justice, South West Africa Cases, Prelimi-
nary Objections (Ethiopia vs. South Africa; Liberia vs. South Africa), 21 December
1962, ICJ Reports 1962, pp. 425–428.
[45] See Valticos, Les Commissions d’enqueˆte de l’Organisation internationale du tra-
vail, op. cit., at pp. 860–861.
[46] The manner in which the Governing Body communicates with the government
concerned during this phase of the complaints procedure is similar to that described
in the representation procedure (Articles 24 and 25).
[47] Between 1960 and 1995 more than 20 complaints were filed. Only nine of the
complaints were submitted by the Governing Body to a Commission of Inquiry;
some of the other complaints were referred to the Committee on Freedom of
Association instead, and for others a friendly settlement was secured, generally
with the assistance of the ILO, as in the France–Panama cases and the Tunisia–
Lybia case.
[48] A closer examination to the composition of commissions of inquiry confirms the
quasi-judicial character of ILO commissions of inquiry. Indeed, in the nine com-
missions of inquiry appointed so far, members included eight professors of law
(four of whom were members of the Institute of International Law), seven mem-
bers of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and five judges or former judges of the
ICJ. Moreover, some members have also been drawn from national judicial bodies,
including several Chief Justices and a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.
41
[49] ILO Commissions of Inquiry have made on-site visits in cases concerning Portugal,
Chile, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
South Africa. In the complaint filed against the government of Poland, the refusal
to cooperate prevented the Commission from making a scheduled on-site visit.
[50] See, Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under Article 26 of the Con-
stitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the complaint on the
observance by Poland of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), presented by delegates at the 68th session
of the International Labour Conference, Official Bulletin, ILO, Vol. LXVII, Spe-
cial Supplement, 1984. See also Manin, A., Quelques re´flexions sur la fonction
de controˆle de l’O.I.T. ( `A propos du rapport sur la liberte´ syndicale en Pologne),
Annuaire Franc¸ais de Droit International (AFDI), vol. 30, 1984, pp. 672–691.
[51] See Report of the Commission of Inquiry, par. 470.
[52] See International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General Report and Observa-
tions Concerning Particular Countries, 75th Session, International Labour Office,
Geneva, Switzerland, 1998, at par. 7.a.
[53] On the possibility of interpreting Article 29(2) as giving to any state the opportunity
to bring the matter before the ICJ, see Adam, op. cit., at pp. 154–155, notes 44–46.
[54] The two main exceptions are Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany.
[55] Until the Constitution’s revision in 1946, Articles 32 and 33 contained references to
economic sanctions, which could be indicated either by the Commission of Inquiry
or by the Permanent Court of International Justice.
[56] In the case of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, it went as far as to recommend
the conclusion of an agreement between the two states regulating the recruiting
of workers in Haiti and the principal conditions of employment, which had to be
publicized in full.
[57] See Valticos, Les commissions d’enqueˆte de l’Organisation internationale du tra-
vail, op. cit., at p. 857; and Adam, op. cit., at p. 150.
[58] See Adam, op. cit., at p. 153. However, this is not the conclusion of Valticos. See
Valticos, Les Commissions d’enqueˆte de l’Organisation internationale du travail,
op. cit., at p. 859.
[59] See Cassese, A., Il controllo internazionale, Giuffr e´, Milan, Italy, 1971, at p. 131ff;
and Adam, op. cit., at p. 161, note 58.
[60] See Adam, op. cit., at p. 161, note 58.
[61] In fact, filing of claims has been rarely done by States. See Cornil, op. cit., at p.
267.
[62] In 1934, the procedure was initiated by an Indian workers delegate with regard
to an alleged violation of Convention No. 1 on Hours of Work in Industry (in
this specific case, in the railways). However, the Indian government promptly
engaged itself to comply with the Convention and the claim was discontinued.
See International Labour Organization, ILO Official Bulletin, vol. 20, 1935, at p.
15. For an analysis of the reasons for the nonuse of the commissions of inquiry
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during the first 40 years of the ILO, see Valticos, Les Commissions d’enqueˆte de
l’Organisation internationale du travail, op. cit., at pp. 849–851; Jenks, C.W., The
International Protection of Trade Union Freedom, Stevens, London, UK, 1957, at
p. 495 ff; and Ghebali, op. cit., at pp. 235–236.
[63] These cases are Ghana against Portugal, filed in 1961; Portugal against Liberia,
1962; workers delegates against Greece, 1968; the International Labour Conference
against Chile, 1974; workers delegates against Dominican Republic and Haiti,
1981; workers delegates against Poland, 1983; a workers NGO against the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1985; International Labour Conference delegates against
Romania, 1989; and International Labour Conference delegates against Nicaragua,
1989.
[64] A complaint filed by the employees delegate of Sweden at the International Labour
Conference in 1991 alleging nonobservance of Convention Nos. 87, 98, and 147
was, upon a decision of the Governing Body at its 262nd session (March–April
1995), not followed up. See Report, 1996.
[65] The origins of the Commission of Inquiry established to investigate the alleged
violation by the Federal Republic of Germany of the 1958 Convention on Discrim-
ination (Employment and Occupation) can be traced to the particular environment
of the Cold War. The task of the Commission was to examine whether or not there
existed in the Federal Republic of Germany discriminatory practices on the basis
of political opinion against public servants and persons seeking employment in the
public service by virtue of the provisions concerning the duty of faithfulness to the
free democratic basic order. These provisions were contained in a decree adopted
by the Prime Minister of the Land on 28 January 1972; a common declaration with
the Federal Chancellor; the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 22
May 1975; and the principles for investigating loyalty to the national Constitution
adopted on 19 May 1976.
[66] On the freedom of association procedure in general, see Pouyat, A.J., The ILO’s
freedom of association standards and machinery: A summing up, International
Labour Review, vol. 121, no. 3, May–June 1982, pp. 287–302.
[67] See ILO Official Bulletin, vol. 33 III, 1950, at p. 86ff.
[68] Sometimes cases are examined during two or more sessions.
[69] According to Jenks, the obligation to grant freedom of association “has taken its
place among the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” See
Jenks, C.W., The international protection of trade unions rights, in E. Luard, ed.,
The International Protection of Human Rights, Thames and Hudson, London, UK,
1967, at p. 52.
[70] Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Orga-
nize, 1948; and Convention No. 98 on Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining,
1949. The importance of being able to apply the freedom of association procedures
to States regardless of whether they have ratified the relevant conventions is some-
what reduced by the observation that the conventions on the freedom of association
have received the highest number of ratifications so far. As of 31 December 1994,
there were 112 ratifications for no. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection
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of the Right to Organize (1948), and 124 for no. 98 on Right to Organize and
Collective Bargaining (1949). For a recent example of the application of this pro-
cedure to a State that was not a member of the ILO but was a member of the United
Nations, see the complaint filed by the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions
against South Africa. This claim has been transferred by the Governing Body to
the United Nations Economic and Social Council; Official Bulletin, LXXI, 1988,
Ser. A, at p. 153. Finally, it should be stressed that in the United Nations system
of protection of human rights, there are other examples of procedures that do not
depend on ratification of any convention by the State concerned. On this point see
Valticos, Once more about the ILO system of supervision, op. cit., at note 18.
[71] See Official Bulletin, vol. 33, 1950, at p. 87.
[72] For example, in the case of the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, see Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UN Doc. UNEP/
OzL. Pro./4/15.
[73] See Servais, J.M., ILO standards on freedom of association and their implemen-
tation, International Labour Review, Vol. 123, No. 6, November–December 1984,
pp. 765–781, at pp. 769–770.
[74] Japan, Report of the Freedom of Association Committee in 1966; Greece, 1966;
Chile, 1975; Lesotho, 1975; USA (Puerto Rico), 1981; and South Africa, 1992.
[75] See Official Bulletin, vol. 33, 1950, at p. 87.
[76] It is impossible to provide clear statistics on this point. There is no official list of
cases submitted to the various compliance monitoring procedures. However, a few
data can be obtained from an analysis of the reports issued by the Governing Body.
Representation procedure (Articles 24–25): For the period from 1985 to 1994,
the ILOLEX Database reports about 30 cases of submission. This figure indicates
those cases in which a Committee of the Governing Body has reported to it on the
specific case; cases regarding freedom of association have been excluded.
Complaints procedure (Articles 26–34): Between 1961 and 1994, more than
20 complaints were filed, only 8 of which were submitted by the Governing Body
to an Commission of Inquiry.
Freedom of Association procedure: Since the creation of this particular pro-
cedure in 1950, more than 1,800 complaints have been filed. However, this figure
is scarcely representative of the work load of ILO bodies on the implementation
of ILO conventions on the freedom of association. In fact, many cases were filed
by different associations on the same matter against the same state and have subse-
quently been joined. Many other cases have been discontinued because states have
complied with ILO conventions before the whole procedure could be considered
by the Committee on the Freedom of Association.
[77] See Samson, K.T., The changing pattern of ILO supervision, International Labour
Review, vol. 118, no. 5, September–October, 1979, pp. 569–587, at p. 579.
[78] See International Labour Organization, Conventions and Recommendations Adopted
by the International Labour Conference, International Labour Office, Geneva,
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Switzerland, 1995, Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Oc-
cupation), 1958; and Convention Nos. 97 (1949) and 143 (1975) on Standards
Relating to Migrant Workers.
[79] In November 1974, the Governing Body received a request by the government of
Israel to institute the procedure for a study of discrimination in the occupied Arab
territories (GB. 194/23/42). After the discussion, it was decided instead to begin the
Director-General’s reports on the situation in the territories and no special survey
was ever carried out. A second attempt occurred in 1982. On this occasion the
Committee on Discrimination discussed a communication transmitted to the Office
by a Uruguayan trade unionist in exile alleging discrimination on the basis of politi-
cal opinion. Given that the government of Uruguay’s reply contested the procedure
itself and that the procedure is based on the State’s consent, the Committee could
only note the Government’s nonacceptance of a special survey (GB.221/13/37, par.
3; GB.222/CD/2/2). See GB.264/6, note 10. For more information on the nonuse
of this procedure, see Report, 1994, at p. 14.
[80] See GB.265/LILS/7, par. 14, and GB.265/8/2.
[81] On the direct contacts procedure, see Von Potobsky, G., On-the-spot visits: An
important cog in the ILO’s supervisory machinery, International Labour Review,
vol. 120, 1981, p. 581.
[82] See International Labour Organization, Report, 1968, p. 6. For information on the
revision in 1973, see Report, 1973, p. 17.
[83] During 1994, New Zealand and Ivory Coast were visited by direct contacts or
advisory missions in the context of cases before the Committee on Freedom of
Association. See Report, 1995, at par. 40.
[84] See International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of Experts on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (par. c), Principles Govern-
ing the Procedure of Direct Contacts, Report III, Part 4A, International Labour
Conference, 63rd Session, 1977.
[85] Ibid., par. b.
[86] See Ghebali, op. cit., at p. 228.
[87] See Samson, op. cit., at p. 572.
[88] See Report, 1977, (par. e).
[89] See Samson, op. cit., at p. 573; and Landy, E., The implementation procedures of
the International Labour Organization, Santa Clara Law Review, vol. 20, 1980, pp.
633–663, at p. 647.
[90] For example, in the case of six countries in the Andean region, direct contacts
took place in 1976 with a view to examining the possibility of uniform application
and ratification of some 25 conventions as a means toward harmonization of labor
legislation.
[91] See International Labour Organization, Report, 1968, at par. 11.
[92] On this aspect of the direct contacts procedure, see Valticos, N., Diplomacy in
an international framework: Some aspects of ILO practice and experience, La
comunita` internazionale, vol. 3, 1974.
[93] See Ghebali, op. cit., at p. 228.
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[94] The Committee of Experts began keeping track of cases of progress only in 1964.
For more information on cases of progress, see Report, 1996, at par. 106. However,
as Landy remarked, this figure tells only part of the story; it does not indicate
the proportion of cases where the Committee of Experts’ observations have led
to compliance. See Landy, The implementation procedures of the International
Labour Organization, op. cit., at p. 648; Landy, The Effectiveness of International
Supervision, op. cit., at p. 66.
[95] For more information on states that have modified their legislation in connection
with an ILO convention, see Report, 1995, at par. 109.
[96] See Leary, op. cit., at p. 595.
[97] Among the studies from scholars are Landy, op. cit.; and Haas, E.B., Human Rights
and InternationalAction: The Case of Freedom of Association, Stanford University
Press, Stanford, CA, USA, 1970, pp. XIII–184. For a study from the ILO, see In-
ternational Labour Organization, The Impact of International Labour Conventions
and Recommendations, International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland, 1976,
p. 104.
[98] The ILO supervisory system occasionally has another interesting, albeit negative,
side effect. When there is pressure to stop violating a standard and a government
concludes that it cannot comply, it can free itself from its obligations by denouncing
the convention. See Landy, The implementation procedures of the ILO, op. cit.,
at p. 648, note 39. ILO conventions adopted after 1932 specify that the right of
denunciation can be exercised at 10-year intervals. Discussion is underway in
the ILO Governing Body to reduce this interval for future conventions. As of 8
December 1995, 76 cases of denunciation without a simultaneous ratification of a
revised version of the instrument had been registered. See, Report, 1996, at par. 13.
[99] The ILO has already been considered as a model for improving the effectiveness
of environmental treaties. See Palmer, G., New ways of making international
environmental law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 86, 1992, pp.
259–283, at pp. 280–281.
[100] See Valticos, Un syste´me de controˆle international, op. cit., at p. 383; Valticos,
Droit internationale du travail, Dalloz, Paris, France, 1983, at p. 629.
[101] See Samson, op. cit., at p. 569 and p. 583.
[102] In international law, “regime” usually refers to a set of rules that are linked to a
specific and locally defined subject matter. For example, Article 34 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea refers to the “   regime of passage
through the straits    .” See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982, in I. Rummel-Bulska, and S. Osafo, eds., Selected Multilateral Treaties in
the Field of the Environment (SMTFE), UNEP, Nairobi, Kenya, 1991, vol. 2, at
p. 165.
[103] For example, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
(Article 16), adopted at London, 2 November 1973, as amended by the Protocol of
1978, adopted at London, 17 February 1978. See 12 International Legal Materials
(ILM) 1319 (1973) and 17 ILM 546 (1978); United Nations Convention on The
Law of the Sea, (Article 313), 2 SMTFE 165; Vienna Convention for the Protection
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of the Ozone Layer, (Article 6), 2 SMTFE 301; United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity, (Article 30), 31 ILM 818; and Framework Convention on
Climate Change, (Article 16), 31 ILM 849.
[104] See CITES, Articles XI.3, paragraphs (d) and (e) concerning the Conference of the
Parties and Article XII.2, paragraphs (d), (g), and (h) concerning the Secretariat.
[105] See Sand, P.H., Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, World
Resources Institute, Washington DC, USA, 1990, pp. VI–61, at p. 14.
[106] These principles have been enumerated by Valticos. See Valticos, N., Fifty years of
standard setting activities by the ILO, International Labour Review, vol. 99–100,
Sept. 1969, pp. 235–236.
[107] See Valticos, Once More About the ILO System of Supervision, op. cit., at p. 100.
[108] See Report of the Director-General, Defending Values, Promoting Change, Report
I, Part 1, International Labour Conference, 81st Session 1994, at p. 53.
[109] See Servais, op. cit., at p. 780.
[110] See Sand, op. cit., at p. 33.
[111] Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991, (Articles 18,
19, and 20), 2 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (YBIEL) 533. United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, (Article 14), 31 ILM
849. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, (Article 27 and
Annex II), 31 ILM 818. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in
Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly
in Africa, 1994, (Article 28), 33 ILM 1328 (1994). Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 1991, (Article 15 and Appendix
VII), UN-ECE, Environmental Conventions (ECE), United Nations, New York,
NY, USA, 1992, at p. 95. Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents, 1992, (Article 21 and Annex XIII), ECE, at p. 119. Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 1992,
(Article 22 and Annex IV), ECE, at p. 161. Convention on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 1992, (Article 26), 3 YBIEL, supple-
ment on disk (doc.1). Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North-East Atlantic, 1992, (Article 32), 32 ILM 1069 (1993).
[112] See O’Connell, M.E., Enforcing the new international law of the environment,
German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 35, 1992, pp. 293–332, at p. 312.
[113] See Report, 1994, at p. 15.
[114] See Landy, The implementation procedures of the ILO, op. cit., at p. 646.
[115] See Valticos, Once more about the ILO system of supervision, op. cit., at p. 103.
[116] For example, the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, (Article 19), 2 SMTFE 449; Organization
for African Unity Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa,
(Article 19), 2 YBIEL 632; Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any
other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 1977, (Article V), 1
SMTFE 72; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973, (Article 6), 1 SMTFE 320.
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[117] Valticos, L’e´volution du syste´me de controˆle de l’Organisation internationale du
travail, op. cit., at p. 519.
[118] Sze´ll, P., The development of multilateral mechanisms for monitoring compliance,
in W. Lang, ed., Sustainable Development and International Law, Graham and
Trotman, London, UK, 1995, pp. 97–109, at p. 107.
[119] See, for example, Convention on Biological Diversity, (Articles 23.4 and 26), 31
ILM 818. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Articles 7.1, 7.2, and 10),
31 ILM 849; and Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
1987, (Article 7), 2 SMTFE 35. The Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents, (Article 23), ECE, at p. 95, refers generically to a periodical
reporting procedure without specifying its content.
[120] In the environmental field, this is the case with the Montreal Protocol. See,
in general, Victor, D.G., The Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure:
Lessons for making other international environmental regimes more effective, in
W. Lang, ed., ¨Osterreichische außerpolitische Dokumentation, Bundesministerium
fu¨r auswa¨rtige Angelegenheiten, Vienna, Austria [in English].
[121] See Constitution of the International Labour Organization [Article 19(8)].
[122] For a description of the different flexibility clauses contained in ILO conventions,
see Ghebali, op. cit., at pp. 207–208. For an example of the possibility of opting for
parts of a convention, see The Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention,
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